Below is the text from a trial brief I used to prevail over the California DMV
from refusing to recognize a name changed without court order.


INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff ____________________, hereafter referred to as I, my, myself, or me,
seeks a declaratory judgment that the Defendant, the Department of Motor Vehicles hereafter referred to as the DMV, is required to recognize legal name change by common law usage. I am also seeking a CCP 1085 Writ of Mandate compelling them to do so for the purpose of obtaining new IDs.


ARGUMENT
Declaratory Judgment and Writ of Mandate against DMV on refusal to recognize name:
Main Point:
Vehicle Code enabling statues VC 12800.7, VC 13000.1(a), DMV regulations Title 13 CR 15.06 and CR 20.04 are unconstitutional, since by refusing to recognize a common law name change they extinguish a fundamental right of the people.
Two issues:
1: Is a common law name change legal and valid?
2: Is it legal for state agencies to refuse to recognize a legal common law name change?

1:A common law name change is legal and valid.
*It has the same validity as a court ordered name change:
"though it had been provided for by a court order"
65 C.J.S. at 26
*Intent of legislature to preserve its validity still remains in the Code:
"Nothing in this code shall be construed to abrogate the common law right of any person to change one's name."
CCP 1279.5(a) and Family Code 2082

*It is a well-settled right in California court cases:
"While Code of Civil Procedure section 1276 embodies a statutory procedure for change of name, that section is designed merely to provide a public record of the change. (3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed.) Personal Property, § 12.) The statute does not supplant the common law rule that a person may, without formal action, adopt any name he or she chooses"
Weathers v Superior Court 54 Cal App 3d 286 at 288; (1976)
And:
"The common law recognizes the right of a person to change his name without the necessity of legal proceedings; the purpose of the statutory procedure is simply to have, wherever possible, the change recorded."
In Re Ritchie 159 Cal App 3d 1070 at 1072; (1984)

*It has a long tradition of validity:
""A name assumed by the voluntary act of a young man at his outset into life, adopted by all who knew him and by which he is constantly called, becomes for all purposes that occur to my mind as much and effectually his name as if he had obtained an act of Parliament to confer it upon him." 5 B. & Ald. at 556, 106 Eng.Rep. at 1294. Land was serious business to the law of England, and we can be sure that a name change made without governmental sanction, if effective to confirm a devise of land, was effective for all purposes whatsoever."
Henne v Wright 904 F 2d 1208 at 1218; (1990) (dissenting)
And in California:
In re Useldinger, 35 Cal. App. 2d 723; 96 P.2d 958; (1939),
In re Ross, 8 Cal. 2d 608; 67 P.2d 94; (1937)

*The right is not disputed directly; the State uses de facto abrogation by refusal to recognize:
"To change one’s name by the common law method is.. "
".. not to unilaterally impose recognition or acceptance of the newly chosen name as an obligation incumbent upon others. In answer to the question presented, we conclude that a common law change of name is valid in California."
Attorney General Opinion No. 00-205 June 9, 2000

2:It is unconstitutional for state agencies to refuse recognition:

The 1st Amendment religious free exercise grounds
**State officials have a duty to recognize religious name change:
"because the 1st Amendment protects an inmates right to legal recognition of an adopted religious name, correctional authorities may not properly condition the receipt of services or benefits upon his waiving such a right."
Barrett v Virginia 689 F 2d 498 at 503; (1982)

"whether or not an inmate has had his name changed by court order pursuant to 10 Del.C. § 5901, Et seq. is not relevant to the issues raised in this case. The Delaware courts have held that even without pursuing the statutory procedure for a change of name, there exists a common law right to change one's name without court process..."
Masjid Muhammed-D.C.C. v. Keve 479 F. Supp. 1311 at 1322 Footnote 13;(1979)

"...Accordingly, to the extent that policy inhibits or burdens plaintiffs' use of their Muslim names or their refusal to acknowledge their old names, its enforcement is inconsistent with the First Amendment."
Masjid Muhammed-D.C.C. v. Keve 479 F. Supp. 1311 at 1323;(1979)

*These cases on duty to recognize should be binding in the 9th circuit:
"Because the issue of religious name changes has been litigated extensively, and courts have consistently recognized an inmate's First Amendment interest in using his new, legal name (at least in conjunction with his committed name), we find that the law was clearly established in the absence of binding Ninth Circuit precedent."
Malik v Brown 71 F 3d 724 at 730; (1995) (9th) Circuit

**To those who would argue that these cases are distinguishable because the agencies also refused to recognize prisoners' statutory name change: (even though the court explicitly held that this is irrelevant to the issue; Masjid Muhammed-D.C.C. v. Keve 479 F. Supp. 1311;(1979) Footnote 13 at 1322, cited above)
(1)While some fundamental rights, like the right to travel, may be lost to inmates as "inconsistent with their status as prisoner[s] of the correctional system." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.817, 822, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495, 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974)
and usage method name change is explicitly lost to inmates in California: CCP 1279.5(a) "Except as provided in subdivision (b), (c), (d), or (e),.."

(2)The public suffers no such loss in their status as free citizens.
Thus the public should not be forced by state agencies to waive their right to a common law name change and thereby have their right diminished to that of prison inmates.

Even if we apply the "lesser standard of scrutiny" from Turner v. Safely 482 US 78 (1987) (possibly superceded), for prisoners' religious free exercise rights, we find:
(1)There is no "valid, rational connection":
To theoretically preserve the right in some statutes, while denying its practice in other statutes, is irrational on its face.
(2)There is no adequate "alternative means of exercising the right":
The court ordered name change is an inadequate means as it may be denied and also places the state improperly between the sincere believer and their God's inspiration in the choice of a certain name. It is also substantially burdensome where the belief embraces freedom.
(3)Non-recognition is an "exaggerated response":
Prevention of fictitious names is a poor rationale, as one's primary ID tends to force nicknames into true names anyway. Furthermore, a Social Security number provides the unique identifier needed by computers, whereas a name does not.
(4)We can "point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis":
All the decades prior, the common law alternative was accommodated by recognition.

**The statutes are also too broad in their sweep:
There is no exemption offered for a sincere name change, a religious name change, and for people who commenced usage method names prior to 1999, the statutes are also ex post facto law. A type of law explicitly unconstitutional in both California and US Constitutions:
("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed"
US Constitution Article 1 Section 9
"A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.
California Constitution Article 1 Declaration of Rights Sec. 9.)
Applied after the fact, the offending statutes also amount to an unreasonable seizure of one's name, without due process, in violation of the 4th and 5th Amendments.


The 1st Amendment free speech grounds
Assume that someone wanted to change his or her name to "End War". They might be hesitant to invest the time and money for a statutory name change, out of fear that it would be denied, at the court's discretion, for being too unconventional. Whereas in a common law name change, they suffer no such fear. The time and costs of a court order act as a prior restraint upon the public, however subtle. Thus the statutory method has a perceptible chilling effect on the public's 1st Amendment freedom of speech right. In the instant case, it is even more acute, as I have already invested over 16 years into my one word name.

"In Matter of Miller, 162 Misc.2d 527, 617 N.Y.S.2d 1024, 1026 (N.Y.C.Civ.Ct.1994) the petitioner applied to change her name legally to "Sena." Her motivations were comparable to those of applicant in this case. Sena believed that the name she had chosen for herself had "unique spiritual and religious importance." Id. 617 N.Y.S.2d at 1025. The New York court denied the application reasoning that a single name would cause too much confusion to society at large."
In re: Rosa Linda Ferner a/k/a Koriander 295 N.J.Super. 409 at 417; (1996)

**The possibility of a fictitious name change does not justify prior restraint:
"D/FW's content-neutral permit system has little in common with the classic prior restraint thought to be the inspiration for the First Amendment. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 51 S. Ct. 625, 630, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931) (discussing the reaction to the English licensing system restricting the publication of literature pending governmental review of its content). See also Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 J. LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955). Nevertheless, prior restraint doctrine has been invoked to strike down content-neutral permit systems that regulate protected First Amendment activities. E. g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, supra; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 78 S. Ct. 277, 2 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1958); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938). These cases teach that governmental authorities may not, except in demanding circumstances, deny access to a public forum in anticipation of consequences that may flow from the contemplated activity."
Sanatani v. Limmer 663 F.2d 619 at 627-8; (1981) (5th) Circuit

**The DMV should be the one to bring suit and bear the burden of proof if they wish to stop a "fictitious" common law name from disturbing the integrity of their records.
"Applying the settled rule of our cases, we hold that a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor. As we said in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, "Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process certainly requires . . . that the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants engaged in criminal speech." "
Freedman v. Maryland 380 U.S. 51; 85 S. Ct. 734 at 738-9; 13 L. Ed. 2d 649 at 654; (1965) U.S.

**The DMV lacks a compelling state interest in requiring a court order:
"Numerous cases have held that administrative convenience is not a compelling state interest. E. g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S. Ct. 1076, 39 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S. Ct. 791, 39 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969). "
Masjid Muhammed-D.C.C. v. Keve 479 F. Supp. 1311 Footnote 15 at 1323;(1979)

**The enabling statutes are excessively broad in allowing the DMV to require only the documents it chooses:
"In the area of freedom of expression it is well established that one has standing to challenge a statute on the ground that it delegates overly broad licensing discretion to an administrative office, whether or not his conduct could be proscribed by a properly drawn statute, and whether or not he applied for a license. "
Freedman v. Maryland 13 L. ED. 2D 649 at 653; (1965)
And:
"It is clear that a party may challenge a licensing statute regardless of whether he or she was denied a permit, or whether one has ever been sought. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151, 89 S. Ct. 935, 938, 22 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1969); ISKCON v. Eaves, 601 F.2d at 823. See also Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 1755, 48 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1976). A court may invalidate an excessively broad grant of discretion on its face, without regard to the particular facts of the plaintiff's case, because the very existence of the discretion lodged in the public official is constitutionally unacceptable. ISKCON v. Eaves, 601 F.2d at 823."
Sanatani v. Limmer 663 F.2d 619 at 625; (1981) (5th) Circuit

**A judicial remedy does not excuse abrogation of common law name change: "Moreover, the availability of a judicial remedy for abuses in the system of licensing still leaves that system one of previous restraint which, in the field of free speech and press, we have held inadmissible. A statute authorizing previous restraint upon the exercise of the guaranteed freedom by judicial decision after trial is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like restraint by administrative action."
Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296; 60 S. Ct. 900; 84 L. Ed. 1213; at 1219 (1940) U.S.

**The due process clause in the 14th Amendment protects 1st Amendment rights from state abridgment:
"Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action."
Lovell v. City of Griffin 303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. ED. 949 at 953; (1938)


The 9th Amendment grounds

**A common law right can be a fundamental right:
"Yet these important but unarticulated rights have nonetheless been found to share constitutional protection in common with explicit guarantees. 16 The concerns expressed by Madison and others have thus been resolved; fundamental rights, even though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized by the Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 448 U.S. 555; 100 S. Ct. 2814; 65 L. Ed. 2d 973; at 991; (1980) U.S.
And:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
9th Amendment, US Constitution

**An un-enumerated right is found fundamental when it has a long tradition of use: "In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is "so rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental." The inquiry is whether a right involved "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those `fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions' . . . ." "
Griswold v.Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1686, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 at 520; (1965)

**An English common law right is fundamental because it's deeply rooted in our history:
"On the 14th of October, 1774, the delegates from the several Colonies and Plantations, in Congress assembled, made a formal declaration of the rights to which their people were entitled, by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English Constitution, and the several charters or compacts under which the colonial governments were organized. Among other things, they declared that their ancestors who first settled the colonies were, at the time of their immigration, "entitled to all the rights, liberties, and immunities of free and natural born subjects within the realm of England;" that by such immigration they by no means forfeited, surrendered, or lost any of those rights, but that they were, and their descendants now are, entitled to the exercise and enjoyment of all such of them as their local and other circumstances entitle them to exercise and enjoy;" and that "the respective colonists are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law." 1 Journal of Congress, 27-8-9."
Hurtado v. People of California. 110 U.S. 516; at 539, 4 S. Ct. 111; 28 L. Ed. 232; at 240; (1884) U.S. (dissenting)
And:
"The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this State."
California Civil Code 22.2

**A common law name change is also constitutionally protected because it has a long California tradition:
"..a right which was not guaranteed by the Federal Constitution but was a creation of state law. Wolff held that even such a liberty interest rooted in state law was entitled to constitutional protection."
Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat 452 U.S. 458; 101 S. Ct. 2460; 69 L. Ed. 2d 158; at 167; (1981) U.S.

**A fundamental right can not be legislated away:
"Again, all of these cases arose under the concept of due process as a limitation upon legislative action. ..

.. there are some rights so fundamental to the individual that they may not be abridged even by action that would ordinarily be within the power of the legislature. The rights guaranteed to the individual by one clause of the Constitution may not be overridden by a power exercised under another part of that Constitution."
Faulkner v. Clifford 289 F. Supp. 895; at 900; (1968)

And:
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624; 63 S. Ct. 1178 at 1185-6; 87 L. Ed. 1628; at 1638; (1943)


CONCLUSION:

**Even a minor intrusion that robs the substance from a public right should be struck down and the DMV should suffer sanction since:
(1)The statute denying abrogation is easily found near the CCP section for statutory name change.
(2) The public at large suffers a needless expense in time and money when changing their name.
(3)By requiring documentation that a common law name changer can not acquire, the DMV has stealthy encroached upon a fundamental right of the people.

"Rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights must be zealously guarded if they are not to be whittled away, little by little, through minor seemingly innocuous intrusions which may, over the course of time, result in significant erosion of those rights. The comment of the Court in Boyd v. United States, supra, 116 U.S. at 635, is particularly apposite to this situation: "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." "
In Re Nwamu 421 F. Supp. 1361 at 1366-7; (1976)